See id., at 2428. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 10226a. . One will search Grutter in vain for similarly persuasive evidence of narrow tailoring as the school districts have presented here. 2. See Brief for Petitioner at 35. The Courts emphasis on benign racial classifications suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria. 2d 834, 839840, and n. 6 (WD Ky. 2004) (McFarland I). Even supposing it mattered to the constitutional analysis, the race-based student assignment programs before us are not as benign as the dissent believes. Id., at 38a. See post, at 6972. . Source: Modified from E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, & G. Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Moreover, Louisvilles history makes clear that a community under a court order to desegregate might submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved the order, but with every intention of following that plan even after dissolution. Upon realizing that the litigation would not be resolved in time for assignment decisions for the 20022003 school year, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion, 294 F.3d 1084 (2002) (Parents Involved III), vacated the injunction, and, pursuant to Wash. Rev. But what about Seattles? The plans are tied to each districts specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. App. The minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments, however, suggests that other means would be effective. gent upon a particular racial mix. There must be at least 15 percent nonwhite students under Jefferson Countys plan; in Seattle, more than three times that figure. To the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that students see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial group, using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. Thus, the dissent argues that [e]ach plan embodies the results of local experience and community consultation. Post, at 47. 05908, at 162a. The plan forbade transfers, however, if the transfer would lead to a school population outside the guideline range, i.e., if it would create a school where fewer than 15% or more than 50% of the students were black. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. 36, 7172 (1873)). Brown v. Board of Education. of Cal. This assertion is inexplicable. 2d, at 370. The discrepancy identified is not some simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the peripheries of the districts use of individual racial classifications. See also Bakke, 438 U.S., at 312, 313, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. E. 2d 750 (opinion of Powell, J.).". At that time, about 20% or 12,000 of the districts students were black. Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. Supreme Court 5:4 decision suggests that the Court is divided in its interpretation of Brown and its intent in . The plurality is wrong to do so. And the combination of the three unsubstantiated elements does not produce an interest any more compelling than that represented by each element independently. This Court recognized as much in its opinion, which stated that the school board had an affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system. McDaniel, supra, at 41. Assertions of general societal discrimination are plainly insufficient. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192. 05908, at 30a. But the district vigorously defends the constitutionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not resume using race to assign students. No case of this Court has ever relied upon the de jure/de facto distinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed to do. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court rejected the interests asserted to justify the layoff program as insufficiently compelling. No. 2, pp. At least one of the academic articles the dissent cites to support this proposition fails to establish a causal connection between the supposed educational gains realized by black students and racial mixing. 1, No. In sum, the districts race-conscious plans satisfy strict scrutiny and are therefore lawful. Another amicus surveys several social science studies and concludes that a fair and comprehensive analysis of the research shows that there is no clear and consistent evidence of [educational] benefits. Brief for David J. Armor etal. See ibid. The histories I have set forth describe the extensive and ongoing efforts of two school districts to bring about greater racial integration of their public schools. wa. Justice Breyers position comes down to a familiar claim: The end justifies the means. Seattle has never operated segregated schoolslegally separate schools for students of different racesnor has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation. Whether or not the Court chooses to afford similar deference to public secondary schools will shape the control school districts have over their own policies. See ibid. No. No distinction was made between various categories of non-whites; Asian-Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and African-Americans were all treated solely as "non-white" for purposes of the tiebreaker. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467 , that interest is not involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved. Five Supreme Court justices rejected voluntary desegregation plans in Seattle and . Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. If we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one. 539 U. S., at 324325 (internal quotation marks omitted). of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971) (The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole), and here Jefferson County has already been found to have eliminated the vestiges of its prior segregated school system. Even if these measures were appropriate as remedies in the face of widespread resistance to Browns mandate, they are not forever insulated from constitutional scrutiny. Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505506 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, supra, at 224. The same must be said for the controlling opinion in Grutter. The statistics cited in Appendix A to the dissent are not to the contrary. The decision today should not prevent school districts from continuing the important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. 1, pp. For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: [T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. (2000 ed., Supp. The dissent elides this distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, casually intimates that Seattles school attendance patterns reflect illegal segregation, post, at 5, 18, 23,[Footnote 15] and fails to credit the judicial determinationunder the most rigorous standardthat Jefferson County had eliminated the vestiges of prior segregation. [Footnote 10]. of Ed. The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case presenting an issue similar to the one here. No. See ante, at 1517, 23 (concurring opinion). of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 437438 (1968), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 745 (1974). 417, 428429 287 N.E. 2d 438, 447448 (1972). schoolId=1043&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1043& Justice Breyers reliance on McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), post, at 2324, 2930, highlights how far removed the discussion in the dissent is from the question actually presented in these cases. [28] He contrasted this circumstance to Grutter, where "the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable" in more than tripling minority representation at the law schoolfrom 4 to 14.5 percent. 2d 358, 376377 (WD Ky. 2000), that decree was dissolved in 2000, id., at 360. [31], The opinion came less than two months before the start of the regular school year in King County and less than three weeks before the start of year-round school in the District. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) (It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it). Indeed, in the context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils. SCHOOLS, PETITIONER, on writ of certiorari to the united states court of Id. The dissents characterization of Swann as recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals isat besta dubious inference. To Harris? See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 11691170 (CA9 2005) (en banc). 05908. Without it, some schools such as Cleveland and Ranier would have remained substantially dominated by minorities, while minority students were denied the opportunity to attend the popular schools outside their neighborhoods. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971), this Court, citing Swann, restated the point. See 39 Ill. 2d, at 599600, 237 N.E. 2d, at 502 (Too, the United States Supreme Court on January 15, 1968, dismissed an appeal in School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, (Mass. It also argues that the plan is not narrowly tailored because it does not seek integration at all racially imbalanced schools, only certain ones. The plan also established Parent Assistance Centers to help parents and students navigate the school selection and assignment process. See Grutter, 539 U. S. 347348 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The plan then drew new geographical school assignment zones designed to satisfy these guidelines; the district could reassign students if particular schools failed to meet the guidelines and was required to do so if a school repeatedly missed these targets. See Freeman, 503 U. S., at 496; Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 118 (Thomas, J., concurring). [29] The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the school districts must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here under review is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. 733, 741742 (1998) (hereinafter Hallinan). Today, they do not. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J. This case was brought by a non-profit organization, Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS), representing parents of students in the Seattle School District (District) who objected to the school districts use of race as a tiebreaker for admission to schools as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Statement in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. Are they to spend days, weeks, or months seeking independently to validate the use of ratios that this Court has repeatedly authorized in prior cases? See, e.g., Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425; North Carolina Bd. 6th ed. [Footnote 11]. area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf; Brief for Respond- The validity of our concern that racial balancing has no logical stopping point, Croson, supra, at 498 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 275 (plurality opinion); internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grutter, supra, at 343, is demonstrated here by the degree to which the districts tie their racial guidelines to their demographics. Both cases present the same underlying legal questionwhether a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. If a school district has an interest in teaching racial understanding and cooperation, there is no logical reason why that interest should not extend to the composition of the teaching staff as well as the composition of the student body. 3, p.1617 (It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 110 (1949))); Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. Initially, as the Court explained just last Term, we are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated. Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 363 (2006). This suggests that a decision against jurisdiction rather than on the merits would be a severe disappointment. See supra, at 45. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) Plaintiff- Parents Involved in Community Schools (non-profit organization led by Kathleen Get started for FREE Continue We granted certiorari. See post, at 6566. The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have faced); post, at 21 (emphasizing the importance of local circumstances and encouraging different localities to try different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); post, at 48 (emphasizing the school districts 40-year history during which both school districts have tried numerous approaches to achieve more integrated schools); post, at 63 ([T]he histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards). App. I have no quarrel with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into American society as full members. 4, 1984) (1984 Memorandum); Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson County Public School District, pp. Pp. The system that was upheld in Grutter considered a number of other factors to assure diversity of not only race but also socioeconomic status, skills, and so forth. 2005) (" Parents IV"). 05915, at 46. Nevertheless, Kennedy found the school districts did not narrowly tailor the use of race to achieve the compelling interests in the case. The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits. 1922). Similarly, the segregationists made repeated appeals to societal practice and expectation. Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races. That school was founded in 1990 as part of the school boards effort to increase academic achievement.[Footnote 12] See African American Academy History, online at http://www. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes. Kennedy argued that the government had an interest in ensuring racial equality: "The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.". The plurality cannot avoid this simple fact. If this interest justifies race-conscious measures today, then logically it will justify race-conscious measures forever. Id., at 3839, 82. Dist. 3 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. These are not affirmative action plans, and hence individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. Franklin in 20052006 was 48.9 percent Asian-American, 33.5 percent African-American, 6.6 percent Latino, 10.2 percent Caucasian, and 0.8 percent Native-American. "But the district vigorously defends the constitutionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not resume using race to assign students. However, if the Court decides that Grutter and Gratz apply in the secondary education context, school districts will still be able to use race as a factor, but in a different way than it is used in the Seattle School Districts plan: race could only be used as a plus in the evaluation of the applicants potential to contribute to the overall diversity of the school. Brief for Respondent at 3334. 05908, pp. . The districts have also failed to show they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Cf. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); Adarand, 515 U. S. 200. These plans are more narrowly tailored than the race-conscious law school admissions criteria at issue in Grutter. 2d 750 (opinion of Powell, J. [Footnote 28]. Again, data support this insight. During and just after World War II, significant numbers of black Americans began to make Seattle their home. See Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5. Part IV (again joined only by a plurality of the Court) addressed Justice Breyer's dissent. Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. . Furthermore, Kennedy found that race-conscious mechanisms can be used by school districts to further the goal of diversity, a position rejected by the plurality. 1967) 227 N.E. 2d 729, which challenged the statute providing for elimination of racial imbalance in public schools for want of a substantial federal question. 389 U. S. 572). They are located in every region of the country and range in size from Las Cruces, New Mexico, with barely over 15,000 students attending 23 schools in 1968, to New York City, with more than one million students in 853 schools. These other meanse.g., where to construct new schools, how to allocate resources among schools, and which academic offerings to provide to attract students to certain schoolsimplicate different considerations than the explicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we express no opinion on their validitynot even in dicta. See 448 U. S., at 539. In 2001, the district adopted its plan classifying students as black or other in order to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. And it was Brown, after all, focusing upon primary and secondary schools, not Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), focusing on law schools, or McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U. S. 637 (1950), focusing on graduate schools, that affected so deeply not only Americans but the world. Percentage of Students in Minority Schools by Race, 20002001. Section 5. They contend that the children who have graduated no longer fulfill the third requirement because the parents merely sought injunctive relief prohibiting the school from using the race in admissions, not monetary damages, and consequently a favorable decision will not redress the injury to those children in any concrete way. Wygant, 476 U. S., at 283. Rather, they apply the strict scrutiny test in a manner that is fatal in fact only to racial classifications that harmfully exclude; they apply the test in a manner that is not fatal in fact to racial classifications that seek to include. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. of Oral Arg. 1, 23 (1995); A. Siqueland, Without A Court Order: The Desegregation of Seattles Schools 10 (1981) (hereinafter Siqueland); D. Pieroth, Desegregating the Public Schools, Seattle, Washington, 19541968, p.6 (Dissertation Draft 1979) (hereinafter Pieroth). 1. in . No. Most are not. Seattle School District No. These plans are unnecessarily crude solutions to the problem of school segregation, which can be achieved through more indirect means. I add that one cannot find a relevant distinction in the fact that these school districts did not examine the merits of applications individual[ly]. See ante, at 1315. 1, 137 F.Supp.2d 1224 (W.D. 7231. And what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards? No. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id., at 21. Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. To use race in this way is not to set a forbidden quota. See id., at 335 (Properly understood, a quota is a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are reserved exclusively for certain minority groups (quoting Croson, 488 U. S., at 496)). At the same time it relies on inapplicable desegregation cases, misstatements of admitted dicta, and other noncontrolling pronouncements, Justice Breyers dissent candidly dismisses the significance of this Courts repeated holdings that all racial classifications must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, see post, at 3133, 3536, arguing that a different standard of review should be applied because the districts use race for beneficent rather than malicious purposes, see post, at 3136. After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria). This Court has recognized that the public interests at stake in such cases are compelling. We have approved of narrowly tailored plans that are no less race-conscious than the plans before us. Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent would constitutionalize todays faddish social theories that embrace that distinction. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 211 (1976) (concurring opinion). Justice Kennedy sets forth two additional concerns related to narrow tailoring. In respect to Louisville, he says first that officials stated (1) that kindergarten assignments are not subject to the race-conscious guidelines, and (2) that the child at issue here was denied permission to attend the kindergarten he wanted because of those guidelines. That is what is at issue here. Yet our tradition is to go beyond present achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that remain. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. Public School Dist., pp. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237, 249250 (1991); Green v. School Bd. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352-353 (Ct. App. The NAACPs First Legal Challenge and Seattles Response, 1969 to 1977. And it is for them to decide, to quote the pluralitys slogan, whether the best way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. Ante, at 4041. Our established strict scrutiny test for racial classifications, however, insists on detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means. Adarand, supra, at 236 (emphasis added). In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart. One conference participant described white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was meant to remain oblivious. Justice Anthony Kennedy did not join parts of the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts. Grutter, supra, at 364365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing sources); see also Fordice, 505 U. S., at 748749 (Thomas, J., concurring). As becomes clearer when the districts plan is further considered, Jefferson County has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 441442 (1968). See Part V, supra, at 5763. Government action dividing people by race is inherently suspect because such classifications promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility, Croson, supra, at 493, reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 657, and endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 603 (OConnor, J., dissenting). See ante, at 4041 (plurality opinion); see also ante, at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring). Again, though, the school boards have no say in deciding whether an interest is compelling. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in No. Hist. See App. Here again, though, the dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the interest. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school districts. Cities that have implemented successful school desegregation plans have witnessed increased interracial contact and neighborhoods that tend to become less racially segregated.